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Comment

The Inherent Constitutionality of the Police
Use of Deadly Force to Stop Dangerous
Pursuits*

I.

INTRODUCTION

Every day in our country, police agencies pursue criminal suspects
who are unlawfully attempling to elude them. Reality-based television
shows, such as Cops and the Police Videos series on the Fox Network,

bring home to the public some measure of the adrenaline-producing
excitement that automobile pursuits engender. Rarely, however, does
one see the tragedy that often results from these pursuits.' While
reliable nationwide statistics on police pursuits are not available, various
studies depict the rate of accidents as ranging from twenty-nine percent
to seventy percent, with a rate of injury ranging from eleven percent to

* Before coming to law school in 1998, the author served as a deputy sheriff with the
Pickens County Sheriffs Office in South Carolina.
1. Geoffrey P. Alpert et. al., The Constitutional Implications of High-Speed Police
Pursuits Under a Substantive Due Process Analysis: Homeward Through the Haze, 27 U.

MEM. L. REV. 599, 661 (1997) ("[Elach year thousands of people are injured and killed
during the course of police pursuits. Many of these people are innocent third parties whose
only fault is being in the wrong place at the wrong time.").
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twenty-seven percent.
Injuries and deaths inflicted upon innocent
third parties have led some to urge for the abolition of police pursuits
when the predicate offenses involved are "minor crimes or traffic
violations."3 Others argue for stricter pursuit policies. 4 Still others
urge a higher degree of police liability for the damage and injuries that
sometimes result. 5
While commentators discuss avenues for police liability and the risks
to society that police chases present, there is a common element missing
in most works on this subject. Quite simply, the focus is shifted away
from the law violator's actions and conduct.' When taken to its logical
conclusion, this position allows the somewhat aberrational result that
the police, merely by deciding to pursue a fleeing suspect, may be liable
for injuries inflicted upon an innocent third party.7
It is the position of this Comment that whenever someone uses a
vehicle to flee unlawfully from the police, the police are justified in using
deadly force to end the pursuit if the suspect drives in any manner
inconsistent with the safe operation of a vehicle. Not only is deadly force
constitutional in these circumstances, it is warranted both from a
tactical and "interests of society" perspective. In short, the risks of
injury or death from police pursuits should be upon the violators who,
by their flight, create the risks, rather than upon the citizenry in
general. This Comment will illustrate the inherent constitutionality of
using deadly force to stop fleeing drivers, and it is hoped that it will
serve as a starting point for discussing the disadvantages of enforcing

2. Id. at 608-17; GEOFFREY P. ALPERT ET. AL, POLICE PURSUIT AND THE USE OF FORCE
III-1 (National Institute of Justice, 1996).
3. Travis N. Jensen, Note, Cooling the Hot Pursuit:Toward a CategoricalApproach, 73
IND. L.J. 1277, 1278 (1998).
4. GEOFFREY P. ALPERT & LORIE A. FRIDELL, POLICE VEHICLES AND FIREARMS 115-29
(Waveland Press, Inc., 1992).
5. Joseph Finarelli, High-speed Police Chases and Section 1983: Why a Definitive
Liability StandardMay Not Matter, 66 DEF. COUNS. J. 238, 246 (1999).
6. See, e.g., Jensen, supra note 3, at 1294.
7. See Haynes v. Hamilton County, 883 S.W.2d 606, 613 (Tenn. 1994). This case
reversed Nevill v. City of Tullahoma, 756 S.W.2d 226 (Tenn. 1988), wherein the court held
that "the police officers did not violate any ... standards of care as a matter of law, and
...the sole proximate cause of the accident was the negligence of [the fleeing driver]." Id.
at 233. In Haynes, however, the court characterized the court's holding in Nevill as a "per
se rule of'no proximate cause,' as a matter of law." 883 S.W.2d at 613. The fallacy of this
characterization is evidenced by the phrase that prefaced the holding in Nevill: "We hold
that in the circumstances of the instant case . . . ." 756 S.W.2d at 233 (emphasis added).
Regardless, the manner in which the court's holding in Nevill was cast by the court in
Haynes illustrates its willingness to allow a police officer's decision to pursue, as contrasted
with the manner in which the officer pursues, to be litigated as the proximate cause of
damage to persons or property. See 883 S.W.2d at 613.
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criminal laws in a manner which while possibly beneficial to the suspect,
is detrimental to society overall.
Part II introduces the statute most often used as a basis for recovery
when constitutional rights are alleged to have been violated, as well as
the qualified immunity doctrine. Part III explains, to the extent
possible, the available statistical data that deal with pursuits. Part IV
examines Supreme Court cases that especially impact consideration of
the constitutionality of the police use of force in the context of pursuits.
Part V examines a series of chases during the course of which deadly
force was used by the police to terminate the pursuits and the subsequent review of these actions by several courts. Part VI provides a
theory on the correct manner in which to view using deadly force to stop
pursuits. Part VII deals with the "violent-felon only" chase policy
adopted by some agencies. Part VIII examines some of the broader
implications of using deadly force to stop dangerous chases. Finally,
Part IX deals with the present inadequacy of alternative means to stop
pursuits.
II.

THEORIES OF LIABILITY

Those injured as a result of pursuits have several options available
upon which to premise recovery from the police. A common approach
when either the pursued suspect or a third party is injured is a claim
brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Rather than serving as a source
of substantive rights, Section 1983 is a vehicle for recovery when federal
rights conferred elsewhere are infringed.9 A prima facie case under this
statute can be made out by alleging (1) the wrongful conduct was
committed by a person acting under color of state law, and (2) the
conduct deprived the victim of some "rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and [federal] laws."1 ° In the context of
pursuits and deadly force, the most applicable source of federal rights
upon which a Section 1983 action may be based when the suspect brings
suit is the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable

8. This statute provides in part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to
be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities

secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress ....
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Supp. IV 1999).
9. Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 816 (1985) (citing Baker v. McCollan, 443
U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979)).
10. Id.
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seizures." When a third party is injured, or when the officer's actions
do not constitute a seizure of the suspect, the Fourteenth Amendment's
guarantee of due process is likely to be looked to as a source of rights. 2
An officer can avoid individual liability for a Section 1983 action by
asserting a defense of qualified immunity."
This defense shields
government officials performing discretionary functions from liability for
civil damages so long as their "conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person
would have known." 4 When a clearly established right is violated, the
proper inquiry for the court is "whether '[tihe contours of the right [are]
sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what
he is doing violates the right.""' 5 Therefore, "[i]f reasonable public
officials could differ on the lawfulness of the defendant's actions," the
officer is entitled to qualified immunity.'6
In the past, local governments were wholly immune from suit under
Section 1983.1' However, municipalities may now be liable if "deliberate action attributable to the municipality itself is the 'moving force'
behind the plaintiff's deprivation of rights."" In other words, the
plaintiff must show his injury was caused by a municipal policy or
custom.' s This requirement "ensures that a municipality is held liable
only for those deprivations resulting from the decisions of its duly

11.

U.S. CONST. amend. IV ("The right of the people to be secure in their persons

...

against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated .... ."); see also Raby v.
Baptist Med. Ctr., 21 F. Supp. 2d 1341, 1347 (M.D. Ala. 1998) (involving alleged use of
excessive force in violation of Fuurth Amendment).
12. U.S. CONST. amend XIV ("No State shall make or enforce any law which shall

abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . ."); see also

Petta v. Rivera, 143 F.3d 895, 901 (5th Cir. 1998) ("[Pllaintiff whose claim is not
susceptible to proper analysis with reference to a specific constitutional right may still
state a claim under § 1983 for a violation of his or her Fourteenth Amendment substantive
due process right. . . ."); County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833 (1998) (stating that

failed attempt at seizure is beyond the scope of the Fourth Amendment).
13. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
14. Id.
15. Fraire v. City of Arlington, 957 F.2d 1268, 1273 (5th Cir. 1992) (quoting Anderson
v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987) (alteration in original)).
16. Id.
17. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187 (1961).
18. Board of County Comm'rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 400 (1997).
19. Id. at 403; see also Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 166
(1993) (stating municipality not liable unless its policy or custom caused the constitutional
injury).
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constituted legislative body or of those officials whose acts may fairly be
said to be those of the municipality."'"
Unlike individual officers, municipalities are not entitled to a qualified
immunity defense under Section 1983.21 This is so because liability
attaches only if "a municipal policy or custom caused the constitutional
injury. "2 2 By the same token, municipalities cannot be held liable for
the actions of their agents through the use of the traditional tort
doctrine of respondeat superior.23 The reason for this is the statute
specifically provides that "[elvery person who deprives a citizen of his
constitutional rights under color of state law "shall be liable to the party
injured." 24 In the Supreme Court's view, this language "'cannot be
easily read to impose liability vicariously on governing bodies solely on
the basis of the existence of an employer-employee relationship with a
tortfeasor.'"2 5 The "no respondeat superior" interpretation of Section
1983 is also supported by its legislative history, which illustrates that
"'while Congress never questioned its power to impose civil liability on
municipalities for their own illegal acts, Congress did doubt its
constitutional power to impose such liability
in order to oblige municipal26
ities to control the conduct of others.'
A second theory of police liability may be found in the tort law of each
state. Whether the party causing the injury was the officer or the
pursued suspect, actions sounding in some form of negligence may be
asserted in addition to constitutional claims.27 Due to the variations
found in state law regarding such topics as proximate cause, intervening
criminal conduct, and the waiver of sovereign immunity, tort law claims
will receive only cursory discussion in this Comment.
III.

STATISTICAL INFORMATION

As noted in Part I, no nationwide statistics have been collected on
pursuits.2" The data that is available consists of surveys of various

20.

Brown, 520 U.S. at 403-04.

21. Leatherman, 507 U.S. at 166; see also Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622,
650 (1980) (rejecting claim that municipalities are entitled to qualified immunity based on

the good faith of their agents).
22. Leatherman, 507 U.S. at 166.
23. Brown, 520 U.S. at 403.

24. 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
25.

Brown, 520 U.S. at 403 (quoting Monell v. New York Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S.

658, 692 (1978)).
26. Id. (quoting Pembaur v. Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469,479 (1986)) (emphasis in original).

27. See, e.g., Hilson v. Department of Pub. Safety, 236 Ga. App. 638, 512 S.E.2d 910
(1999); Oberkramer v. City of Ellisville, 650 S.W.2d 286 (Mo. App. 1983).

28.

ALPERT,

supra note 2, at III-1.
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police agencies across the country. Of primary importance to the present
issue are the accident, injury, and death rates which have been shown.
In a study conducted by the California Highway Patrol in the early
1980s, it was found that of the 683 pursuits engaged in, 198 (29%)
resulted in accidents, 99 (11%) resulted in injuries, and 7 (1%) resulted
in deaths. 29 The study also found that 77% of the suspects were
apprehended.3 0 A 6-year survey of data from the Baltimore County
31
Police shows that of 1,064 pursuits, 388 (36%) resulted in accidents.
However, neither the death nor injury rates from these pursuits were
reported.3 2
A survey conducted in 1994 by the Minnesota Board of Peace Officer
Standards and Training found that out of 764 pursuits conducted
statewide, 307 (40%) ended in accidents, 205 (27%) resulted in injuries,
and only 1 (.001%) resulted in a death.33 However, this data excluded
pursuits by the Minnesota Highway Patrol, which keeps separate
records.34 Its records show that in 1994, the Highway Patrol was
involved in 123 pursuits, with 86 (70%) ending in accidents and 30 (24%)
resulting in injuries.35 The death rate was not reported. 36
A complex analysis of 129 agencies in Illinois examined 700 pursuits
that took place between 1991 and 1992. 3 ' This study found an accident
rate of 39% (273), an injury rate of 11% (77), and a death rate of 1.7%
(12). 3" It also examined several crime categories, finding that "pursuits
involving minor traffic violations resulted in accidents 22% of the time,
[those involving] suspected stolen vehicles resulted in an accident 68%
of the time[,I and pursuits initiated for a suspected DUI resulted in an
accident 48% of the time, as compared to the 39% overall average."39
Importantly, the study also found that "31% of all accidents involved
innocent bystanders and that the most common terminating event (39%)
was an accident."4 ° An additional point of note is that data from the

29. Id. at 111-2.
30. ALPERT & FRIDELL, supra note 4, at 102.
31. ALPERT, supra note 2, at 111-3.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 111-4.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 111-7.

38. Id.
39.

Id.

40. Alpert, supra note 1, at 618.
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two largest police agencies in the state, the Chicago Police Department
and the Illinois State Police, were not included in the analysis.4 '
Another detailed survey took place between 1985 and 1987 in Dade
County, Florida.42 This study was based on data collected by the two
major agencies in Dade County, the Metro-Dade Police Department and
the Miami Police Department.43
During the survey period, 952
pursuits were analyzed."' Of these, 364 (38%) resulted in accidents,
160 (17%) resulted in injuries, and 7 (.7%) ended in a death.45 Of the
pursuits, 102 (10.7%) ended in injury to the suspect or his passenger, 17
(1.8%) ended with injuries to an officer only, and 9 (.95%) ended with
injuries to bystanders only.46 Additionally, 4 pursuits (.4%) resulted in
injuries to both an officer and a bystander.4 7 Interestingly, the study
also noted 7 suspects were killed as a result of the chases.48 While not
explicitly stated, apparently all deaths that occurred during the survey
period were suspects' deaths.
The study showed the majority of pursuits, 512 (54%), were initiated
for traffic violations. 49 The Florida officers made 646 arrests overall,
leading to an arrest rate of 68%.' ° Of these, 305 (47%) involved
pursuit-related arrests. 1
However, felony arrests that were not
pursuit-related accounted for 314 (49%) of the total arrests. 52 Thus,
because half of the total arrests presumably arose from chases that
originally were intended to be stops for traffic violations, these figures
clearly imply that pursuits serve an important function in getting felons
off the streets, regardless of the offense which formed the basis for the
initial stop. Accordingly, the Dade study lends credence to the idea that
when a person flees after an officer attempts to stop him for a motor

41. Id. at 617.
42. ALPERT & FRIDELL, supra note 4, at 105.
43. Id. In December 1997 the Metro-Dade Police Department was re-named the MiamiDade Police Department. Miami-Dade Police Department History (visited Nov. 4, 2000)
<http://www.mdpd.com/history.html>.
44. ALPERT & FRIDELL, supra note 4, at 105.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 106.
47. Id.
48. Id.

49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 105. While the text lists this percentage as 49%, the author's calculations
show it to be 47%.
52. Id. The text shows this percentage as 50%, while the author's calculations show
it to be 49%.
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vehicle infraction, the officer is justified in thinking the suspect is
running for a reason unrelated to the traffic violation.53
A study of the Omaha Police Department analyzed 229 pursuits that
occurred between 1992 and 1994. 54 These chases resulted in accidents
72 times (32%) and in injuries 31 times (14%). 55 Injuries occurred to
the suspect or passenger in 25 cases (10.9%), to an officer in 4 instances
(1.75%), and to bystanders twice (.87%)." 6 Similar to the Dade study,
the Omaha survey found that 112 (51%) of the chases were initiated for
traffic offenses, while 89 (40%) were initiated for felonies or suspected
felonies.57 In the latter category, stolen vehicles accounted for 40% of
the felony pursuits, shooting incidents for 14%, and hit-and-run
situations for 11%.r 8

During the survey period (1992-1994), 85 pursuits were reported in
1992; 17 were reported in 1993; and 122 were reported in 1994. 59 The
increase in 1994 was due to the department's implementation of a less
restrictive pursuit policy.60 In 1992, the department had a "no chase"
policy."1 This was amended within months thereafter to allow pursuits
of violent felons.12 Modifications to the violent-felon policy were made
in 1994 because, once it became known in the community that the police
could not chase,
very few people would comply when the police initiated
6 3
a traffic stop.

Unfortunately, conclusions derived from these studies are not wholly
reliable. This unreliability is due to numerous factors, as partially
recognized by the authors of a survey funded by the National Institute
of Justice:
[Tihese data must be interpreted and compared with caution. For
example, the California Highway Patrol study used mostly freeway

53. A similar point was recently made by the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals. See infra
text accompanying note 240.
54. Alpert, supra note 1, at 619.
55. Id. at 621.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 620. Of the rest, "[elight (4%) were initiated for reckless driving or DUI's,
seven (3.5%) were initiated because of suspect vehicles, and three (1%) were initiated for
known previous pursuits." Id. at 620-21.

58. Id. at 621.
59. Id. at 619.

60. Id.
61. Telephone Interview with Sergeant Dan Cisar, Public Information Officer, Omaha
Police Department (November 11, 2000).

62. Id.
63. Id. Sgt. Cisar stated: "It got to be pointless to attempt to do traffic stops. They
would take off, knowing we couldn't chase them. It really got to be very frustrating."
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data; the Miami study used data from a large county police department
(formerly a sheriff's department); the Baltimore County data are from
another large county agency; and the Minnesota and Illinois data
represent data from large, small and medium sized agencies from
urban, rural and suburban areas.'
Further, the available data sets do not illustrate the traffic conditions
involved in each chase (such as a deserted country road late at night
versus downtown traffic at rush hour), the type of vehicles involved (not
only the models, but their condition), the types and relative severity of
the injuries that resulted, the speeds at which the chases occurred, nor
a multitude of other factors. With the exception of the Illinois, Dade,
and Omaha studies, there is no data explaining why the officers initiated
the traffic stops that led to the pursuits. And while the Illinois and
Omaha surveys attempt to give a partial list of crimes that led to chases,
the Dade study merely notes that most, fifty-four percent, were initiated
for traffic violations.65
Additionally, though the implication is present in the Dade study, the
surveys do not reveal whether the offender, once arrested, was found to
have a reason for fleeing other than the reason for which the officer
originally attempted to stop him. Finally, one can also question what
type of activity was considered a chase for purposes of the various
studies.66
IV.

A.

STANDARDS IMPOSED BY THE SUPREME COURT

The Fleeing-Felon Doctrine

Most students of criminal and constitutional law are familiar with the
fleeing-felon doctrine as enunciated by the Supreme Court in Tennessee
8
v. Garner.
" There, a rule emerged that deadly force may be used to
apprehend a fleeing felon only if "it is necessary to prevent [the
suspect's] escape and the officer has probable cause to believe that the

64.

ALPERT, supra note

65.

See supra text accompanying notes 39, 49, and 57-58.

2, at 111-2.

66. In agencies which prohibit chases in some manner, it is not unusual for officers to
advise other officers by radio that they are involved in "rolling stops." This action brings
assistance, and the "rolling stop" continues until the suspect pulls over or is otherwise
forced to stop. Of course, it is difficult to distinguish this sort of event from a "chase."
Interview with an unnamed 12-year veteran of the Myrtle Beach Police Department, in
Pickens, S.C. (May 1998).
67. 471 U.S. 1, 11 (1985).
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suspect poses a significant threat of death or serious physical injury to
the officer or others."68
In Garner, a Memphis police officer responded to a prowler call at
around 10:45 p.m. Upon arrival, the complainant informed the officer
she heard glass breaking next door and that "they" were breaking in.
The officer went behind the house to investigate, heard a door slam, and
saw a person run across the backyard. As the suspect reached a fence
at the edge of the yard, the officer ordered him to halt and took a few
steps in his direction. At that point the suspect began to climb over the
fence. Convinced the suspect would escape if he made it over the fence,
the officer shot him. The suspect later died at a Memphis hospital.69
The suspect's family brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations
of the suspect's constitutional rights under the Fourth, Fifth, Eighth,
and Fourteenth Amendments.7 ° At the time of the shooting, the officer
was acting under the authority of a Tennessee statute that allowed an
"'officer to use all necessary means to effect the arrest"' of a person who
either fled from or forcibly resisted arrest, so long as notice of the intent
While departmental policy was more
to arrest had been given. 7
restrictive than the statue, it "still allowed the use of deadly force in
cases of burglary."72 After two trips to the district court and Sixth
Circuit Court of Appeals, the case came before the Supreme Court on a
writ of certiorari.73
The Court initially determined "that apprehension by the use of deadly
force is a seizure subject to the reasonableness requirement of the
Fourth Amendment."7 4 It noted that to determine the constitutionality
of a seizure, it was obligated to "'balance the nature and quality of the
intrusion ... against the importance of the governmental interests
alleged to justify the intrusion.' 7' The Court remarked upon the
suspect's interests in his own life and the state's interests in effective
law enforcement.76 It also pointed to the interests of both society and
the suspect in "judicial determination of guilt and punishment."7 7 After

68. Id. at 3.
69. Id. at 3-4.
70. Id. at 5.
71. Id. at 4-5 (quoting TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-7-108 (1982)). While not delineated in
the statute, Tennessee law forbade the use of deadly force to arrest a misdemeanant. Id.
at 5 n.5.
72. Id. at 5.
73. Id. at 7.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 8 (quoting United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 703 (1983)).
76. Id. at 9.
77. Id.
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balancing the various interests at stake, the Court was not persuaded
that "shooting nondangerous fleeing suspects is so vital as to outweigh
the suspect's interest in his own life."78 It therefore struck down the
Tennessee statute as unconstitutional, commenting that "[a] police
officer may not seize an unarmed, nondangerous suspect by shooting him
dead.""9
Justice O'Connor authored a stinging dissent, which Chief Justice
Burger and Justice Rehnquist joined, wherein she noted the majority's
statements regarding the suspect's interest in his own life "hardly
provides an adequate substitute for the majority's failure to acknowledge
the distinctive manner in which the suspect's interest in his own life is
even exposed to risk." 0 Importantly, she also recognized that "[tihe
Court's opinion, despite its broad language, actually decides only that
the shooting of a fleeing burglary suspect who was in fact neither armed
nor dangerous can support a § 1983 action."81
B.

The "ReasonablePolice Officer" Standard

In Graham v. Connor,82 the Supreme Court made explicit an implicit
point from Garner; namely, that claims of excessive force in the course
of an arrest or other seizure are properly analyzed under the Fourth
Amendment's reasonableness standard. 3 Unfortunately, the facts in
this case are not likely to make a police officer's chest swell with pride.
After feeling the onset of an insulin reaction, Graham, a diabetic,
asked a friend to drive him to a convenience store so he could purchase
orange juice that would counteract the insulin in his system. The friend,
Berry, agreed. The two traveled to a nearby store, and Graham
proceeded inside. However, upon seeing the number of people in line at
the store, Graham left and returned to his friend's car. He then asked
Berry to drive him to another friend's house. A police officer saw
Graham leave the store in a hurry and became suspicious. The officer
stopped the vehicle about half of a mile from the store, and, despite
being told about Graham's diabetic problem, ordered the two men to
remain in the car until he could find out what happened at the store.
As other police units arrived, Graham exited his vehicle,
ran around
84
Berry's car twice, sat down on the curb, and passed out.

78.
79.
80.
81.

Id. at 11.
Id.
Id. at 29 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
Id. at 31-32.

82. 490 U.S. 386 (1989).
83. Id. at 395; Garner,471 U.S. at 7.

84. Graham, 490 U.S. at 388-89.
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As one of the officers handcuffed Graham, Berry again attempted to
explain Graham's condition to the officers. These attempts were ignored,
and the officers picked Graham up, carried him over to Berry's car, and
placed him on the hood. When he regained consciousness, Graham told
the officers about a diabetic decal he carried in his wallet. The officers
responded by shoving Graham's face against the hood of Berry's car,
then carried him to a patrol car and threw him inside. During the
course of this incident, Graham suffered an injured shoulder, a broken
foot, cuts to both wrists, and several bruises. After the primary officer
finally received a report that Graham had done nothing wrong at the
convenience store, the officers drove him home and released him.8"
Graham brought a Section 1983 action against the officers, claiming
excessive force was used during the stop that resulted in a violation of
his rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.86 The Court began by
rejecting the idea "that all excessive force claims brought under § 1983
are governed by a single generic standard."87 It reasoned that a proper
Section 1983 analysis involves "identifying the specific constitutional
right allegedly infringed" and judging the action according to the specific
constitutional standard that applies.88 The Court then noted that,
when an excessive force claim evolves out of an "arrest or investigatory
stop of a free citizen, it is most properly characterized as one" which
invokes the protections of the Fourth Amendment. 9 Thus, the Court
held that "all claims that law enforcement officers have used excessive
force-deadly or not-in thc course of an arrest, investigatory stop, or other
'seizure' of a free citizen should be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment and its 'reasonableness' standard, rather than under a 'substantive
due process' approach." °
Importantly, the Court recognized the "right to make an arrest or
investigatory stop necessarily carries with it the right to use some
degree of physical coercion or threat thereof to effect it."91 It also
recognized that "police officers are often forced to make split-second
judgements-in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly
evolving-about the amount of force that is necessary in a particular
situation."92
It therefore stated that "[tihe 'reasonableness' of a

85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id.
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

389.
390.
393.
394.
395.
396 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22-27 (1968)).
397.
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particular use of force must be judged from the perspective of a
reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of
hindsight."9" Thus, "the question is whether the officers' actions are
'objectively reasonable' in light of the facts and circumstances confronting them, without regard to their underlying intent or motivation."94
To assist in this analysis, the Court listed three factors of special
importance in the calculus of what is a reasonable use of force under the
Fourth Amendment: "the severity of the crime at issue, whether the
suspect poses an immediate danger to the safety of the officers or others,
and whether he is attempting to evade arrest by flight."95 Because the
Court of Appeals had analyzed the case using a substantive due process
standard, the Court remanded the case to the Fourth Circuit for
consideration under the Fourth Amendment reasonableness standard.9 6
C.

The "Dead-Man"Roadblock

In Brower v.County of Inyo,9 v the Supreme Court dealt with whether
the police seized a fleeing suspect who ran into a roadblock.98 The
deceased suspect's family brought suit for excessive force, alleging the
police:
(1) caused an 18-wheel tractor-trailer to be placed across both lanes of
a two-lane highway in the path of Brower's flight, (2) "effectively
concealed" this roadblock by placing it behind a curve and leaving it
unilluminated, and (3) positioned a police car, with its headlights on,
between Brower's oncoming vehicle and the truck, so that Brower
would be "blinded" on his approach.99
The district court, noting that establishing a roadblock in the manner
alleged was not unreasonable given the circumstances, dismissed plaintiff's complaint.1" The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, but

93. Id. at 396.
94. Id. at 397 (citing Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 137-39 (1978); Terry, 392
U.S. at 21).

95. Id.
96. Id. at 399.
97. 489 U.S. 593 (1989).
98. Id. at 599.
99. Id. at 594.
100. Id. Specifically, the district court "distinguished Garner, concluding that the high
speed chase along the highway constituted a 'substantial threat,' absent in Garner, 'to the
chasing officers, other drivers, and passersby.'" Brower v. County of Inyo, 884 F.2d 1316,
1317 (9th Cir. 1989).
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the basis for its decision was that no seizure of the suspect had occurred.''
The Supreme Court began its analysis by noting that "[vliolation of
the Fourth Amendment requires an intentional acquisition of physical
control." 2 So long as the detention itself is willful, a "seizure occurs
even when an unintended person or thing is the object of the detention." 103 Thus, a seizure occurs "only when there is a governmental
termination of freedom of movement through means intentionally
applied.""0 4 Phrased another way, if a person is "stopped by the very
instrumentality set in motion or put in place in order to achieve that
result," a seizure has taken place."0 5 Accordingly, the Court held that
Brower was seized when he ran into the roadblock which had been
placed across the highway to stop him.106 The Court thus reversed and
remanded the case to the
Ninth Circuit for consideration of whether the
10 7
seizure was reasonable.

D. The Point When Seizure Occurs
While not involving a vehicle chase, California v. Hodari D.'l s
provides relevant guidance on the topic of pursuits. At best, however,
the Court's opinion leaves the answer to an important question murky.
In Hodari, two police officers on patrol in a high-crime area of Oakland,
California, came upon a group of youths standing around a parked car.
Upon seeing the unmarked patrol unit, the youths fled in different
directions. One officer, Pertoso, gave chase on foot, cutting across a side
street in an effort to outmaneuver the suspects. This tactic succeeded.
As one of the youths, Hodari, emerged from an alley and ran north, he
did not see the officer until Pertoso was almost upon him. At that point,

101. Brower, 489 U.S. at 594.
102. Id. at 596.
103. Id. (citations omitted).
104. Id. at 597 (emphasis removed). To illustrate the point, Justice Scalia, writing for
the majority, offered the following example:
[11f a parked and unoccupied police car slips its brake and pins a passerby against
a wall, it is likely that a tort has occurred, but not a violation of the Fourth
Amendment. And the situation would not change if the passerby happened, by
lucky chance, to be a serial murderer for whom there was an outstanding arrest
warrant-even if, at the time he was thus pinned, he was in the process of running
away from two pursuing constables.
Id. at 596.
105. Id. at 599.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 599-600. While the Ninth Circuit remanded the case to the district court,
there are no subsequent opinions from that court on the reasonableness of the seizure in
this case. Brower, 884 F.2d at 1318.
108. 499 U.S. 621 (1991).
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Hodari threw away what appeared to be a small rock. Seconds later,
Pertoso tackled Hodari and handcuffed him. The rock that Hodari had
thrown was found to be crack cocaine.' 0 9
A juvenile proceeding was brought against Hodari, who later moved
to suppress the cocaine. This motion was denied without an opinion. n0
In reversing the decision, the California Court of Appeal held "that
Hodari had been 'seized' when he saw Officer Pertoso running towards
him, that this seizure was unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment,
and that the evidence of cocaine had to be suppressed as the fruit of that
illegal seizure.""' The California Supreme Court declined to review
the decision, and the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari."2
Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia began by noting that "[flor
most purposes at common law, the word [seizure] connoted not merely
grasping, or applying physical force to, the animate or inanimate object
in question, but actually bringing it within physical control."" 3 Yet an
arrest under common law was accomplished by "'merely touching,
however slightly, the body of the accused, by the party making the arrest
and for that purpose, although he does not succeed in stopping or
holding him even for an instant.' ' . 4 The Court questioned this idea:
To say that an arrest is effected by the slightest application of physical
force, despite the arrestee's escape, is not to say that for Fourth
Amendment purposes there is a continuing arrest during the period of
fugitivity. If, for example, Pertoso had laid his hands upon Hodari to
arrest him, but Hodari had broken away and had then cast away the
cocaine, it would hardly be realistic to say that that disclosure had
been made during the course of an arrest."'

The Court recognized that no physical force was applied to Hodari until
after the cocaine had been thrown away. 6 It then phrased the issue
before it as "whether, with respect to a show of authority as with respect
to [the] application of physical force, a seizure occurs even though the
subject does not yield."" 7
The Court reasoned that while the term seizure "readily bears the
meaning of a laying on of hands or application of physical force to

109. Id. at 622-23.

110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

Id. at
Id.
Id.
Id. at
Id. at
Id.
Id.
Id. at

623.
624.
625 (quoting A. CORNELIUS, SEARCH AND SEIZURE 163-64 (2d ed. 1930)).
626.
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restrain movement," it does not apply "to the prospect of a policeman
yelling 'Stop, in the name of the law!' at a fleeing form that continues to
flee."" 8 In the Court's view, such an assertion of authority does not
constitute a seizure because there is no submission to the show of
authority.19 Accordingly, it ruled that "[an arrest requires either
physical force (as described above) or, where that is absent, submission
1 20
to the assertion of authority."
The Court's opinion clearly holds that, when there is only an assertion
of authority by police, the suspect's submission to that authority is
required before a seizure may be deemed to have taken place.' 21 Also,
the Court's dicta clearly implies that the application of force is enough
122
to constitute a seizure, but only when the seizure itself is successful.

However, the Court's language indicates that this sort of application of
force is not a sufficient cause for seizure to occur.123

It thus leaves

118. Id.

119. Id.
120. Id. (emphasis removed). The Court's parenthetical apparently refers to its
language described supra in the text accompanying note 115.
121. Id.; see also United States v. Zapata, 18 F.3d 971, 976 (1st Cir. 1994) ("[The]
solitary innovation [in Hodari] is to add the requirement that the suspect submit.").
122. Hodari, 499 U.S. at 625.
123. See supra text accompanying notes 114-15, 117, and 120. Of particular importance
is the Court's presentation of the issue and its immediate answer: "The narrow question
before us is whether, with respect to a show of authority as with respect to application of
physical force, a seizure occurs even though the subject does not yield. We hold that it does
not." 499 U.S. at 626. One interpretation of this language is that it equates "show of
authority" with "application of physical force" and determines that, if either is used but not
submitted to, no seizure occurs. Consistent with this view is the Court's statement that
"[to say an arrest is effected by the slightest application of physical force, despite the
arrestee's escape, is not to say that for Fourth Amendment purposes there is a continuing
arrest." Id. at 625. Also consistent with this is the parenthetical that the Court used in
the rule it propounded: "An arrest requires either physical force (as described above) or,
where that is absent, submission to the assertion of authority." Id. at 626. However, a
different interpretation is thnt the "as with respect to" phrase is an attempt by the Court
to state something along the lines of "like the situation that is present when." This view
seems to be the one adopted by the First Circuit. In explaining Hodari, that court omitted
the parenthetical and stated that "absent force, a seizure is not effected until the suspect
has submitted." Zapata, 18 F.3d at 976. This statement indicates the First Circuit is of
the opinion that the application of force triggers a seizure whether it is submitted to or not.
The problem with this view is that it seems to ignore the Supreme Court's hypothetical
involving a suspect who breaks away from an officer's grasp and throws away his
contraband. Hodari, 499 U.S. at 625. In that situation, the Court clearly believes it is
"hardly realistic to say that disclosure [was] made during the course of an arrest." Id.
Finally, it requires one to ignore, as the First Circuit did, the parenthetical phrase "(as
described above)," which the Court used in its holding. Id.
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unanswered when and under what circumstances the unsuccessful
application of force will be deemed to constitute a seizure.
E.

The Fourteenth Amendment's "Shocks the Conscience" Standard
' the Supreme Court resolved a
In County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 24
split in the circuits concerning the proper measure of culpability to apply
when police officers engage in pursuits and injure others."' The Court
held that for the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of substantive due
process to be violated by a police officer engaged in a high-speed pursuit,
"only a purpose to cause harm unrelated to the legitimate object of
arrest will satisfy the element of arbitrary conduct shocking to the
conscience, necessary for a due process violation." '26
After resolving a call in a residential neighborhood, a Sacramento
County deputy sheriff witnessed a motorcycle occupied by two people
approach his car at a high speed. The deputy, Stapp, turned his
emergency lights on, yelled for the motorcycle to stop, and pulled his car
closer to another deputy's car in an attempt to block the motorcycle's
progress. The driver maneuvered the motorcycle between the two patrol
cars and again sped off. The second deputy, Smith, engaged his lights
and siren and began pursuing the motorcycle. The motorcycle wove in
and out of oncoming traffic, forcing two cars and a bicyclist off the road.
The chase lasted 75 seconds and covered 1.3 miles as the vehicles
proceeded through the neighborhood, reaching speeds up to 100 miles an
hour. As the motorcycle's driver attempted to make a sharp left turn,
the motorcycle tipped over. While the driver rolled clear, the passenger
did not. The deputy's car hit the passenger at forty miles an hour,
knocked
him seventy feet down the road, and caused massive inju12 7
ries.
The deceased passenger's parents brought a Section 1983 action
against Deputy Smith, the sheriff's department, and the county, alleging
a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment's substantive due process right
to life."
The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's grant of
summary judgment for Smith after finding a genuine issue of material
124.
125.

523 U.S. 833 (1998).
Id. at 839. Compare Lewis v. Sacramento County, 98 F.3d 434,441 (9th Cir. 1996)

("deliberate indifference" or "reckless disregard") and Spears v. City of Louisville, No. 935921, 1994 WL 262054, at *2 (6th Cir. June 14, 1994) (unpublished table decision) (holding
police must have acted unreasonably and intentionally with disregard of a known risk)
with Evans v. Avery, 100 F.3d 1033, 1038 (1st Cir. 1996) ("shocks the conscience") and
Fagan v. Vineland, 22 F.3d 1296, 1306-07 (3d Cir. 1994) (en banc) ("shocks the conscience").
126. 523 U.S. at 836.
127. Id. at 836-37.
128. Id. at 837.
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fact existed as to whether "Smith's conduct amounted to deliberate
indifference." '29
Several amicus briefs were filed with the Court that raised the issue
of whether "facts involving a police chase aimed at apprehending
suspects can ever support a due process claim." 3 ' The Court rejected
this contention, noting that Graham
"does not hold that all constitutional claims relating to physically
abusive government conduct must arise under either the Fourth or
Eighth Amendments; rather, Graham simply requires that if a
constitutional claim is covered by a specific constitutional provision,
such as the Fourth or Eighth Amendment, the claim must be analyzed
under the standard appropriate to that specific provision, not under the
rubric of substantive due process." '
Thus, the Court first analyzed whether the claim was covered by the
Fourth Amendment.'32 Citing Hodari, the Court noted an attempted
seizure does not constitute a seizure. 33 It also noted that Brower
requires a "'termination of freedom of movement through means
Because the
intentionally applied'" before a seizure may be found.'
decedent was killed by accident rather than through means intentionally
applied, the Court held the "more-specific-provision rule" from Graham
allowed the claim to proceed under a substantive due process theory.'3 5
The Court recognized that the concept of due process was intended to
provide protection from arbitrary governmental action.13 It also noted
the Due Process Clause was designed "to prevent government officials
'from abusing [their] power, or employing it as an instrument of
oppression.'"' 7 It then pointed to a long line of decisions that deemed

129. Id. at 837-38.
130. Id. at 842. This argument was apparently sound in view of the Court's holding
in Graham that "all claims that law enforcement officers have used excessive force-deadly
or not-in the course of an arrest, investigatory stop, or other 'seizure' of a free citizen
should be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment and its 'reasonableness' standard, rather
than under a 'substantive due prccess' approach." 490 U.S. at 395.
131. Sacramento, 523 U.S. at 843 (quoting United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 272
n.7 (1997)).
132. Id.
133. Id. at 843-44.
134. Id. at 844 (quoting Brower, 489 U.S. at 597) (emphasis removed).
135. Id.

136. Id. at 845.
137. Id. at 846 (quoting Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 126 (1992)
(alteration in original) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)).

20011

DANGEROUS PURSUITS

1617

"the cognizable level of executive abuse of power as that which shocks
the conscience."3 8
The Court made clear that the "due process guarantee does not entail
a body of constitutional law imposing liability whenever someone cloaked
with state authority causes harm."'39 In other words, the "'Constitution ... does not purport to supplant traditional tort law.""'4 For this
reason, "liability for negligently inflicted harm is categorically beneath
the threshold of constitutional due process."'
Only "conduct intended
to injure in some way unjustifiable by any government interest is the
sort of official action most likely to rise to the conscience-shocking level"
that is actionable in a due process claim.'
The Court reasoned that
while deliberate indifference might be the appropriate standard to
govern due process claims filed by prisoners deprived of medical
4
treatment, that standard is not applicable to high-speed pursuits.
The primary reason for this view is that "the standard is sensibly
employed only when actual deliberation is practical."'" Thus, "deliberate indifference does not suffice for constitutional liability . . . when a
prisoner's claim arises not from normal custody but from response to a
violent disturbance."' 45 In these circumstances, liability is determined
by measuring "'whether force was applied in a good faith effort to
maintain or restore discipline
or maliciously and sadistically for the very
' 46
purpose of causing harm. "
The Court explicitly recognized the conundrum facing police officers
in the contexts of pursuits, in that
on an occasion calling for fast action[, they] have obligations that tend
to tug against each other.... They are supposed to act decisively and
to show restraint at the same moment, and their decisions have to be
made "in haste, under
pressure, and frequently without the luxury of
147
a second chance."
Clearly, chases do not present a situation in which measured deliberation is practical. The Court believed that, in these circumstances,
recognizing a due process violation "when only midlevel fault has been

138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.

Id.
Id. at 848.
Id. (quoting Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 332 (1986)).
Id. at 849.
Id.
Id. at 852-53.
Id. at 851.

145. Id. at 852.
146. Id. at 853 (quoting Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320-21 (1986)).
147. Id. (quoting Whitley, 475 U.S. at 320).
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shown would be to forget that liability for deliberate indifference to
inmate welfare rests upon the luxury enjoyed by prison officials of
having time to make unhurried judgments, upon the chance for repeated
reflection, largely uncomplicated by the pulls of competing obligaThus, it reconciled the "deliberate indifference" versus
tions."' 4
"conscience-shocking" standards by noting that "[wihen such extended
opportunities to do better are teamed with protracted failure even to
care, indifference is truly shocking." '49 However, "when unforeseen
circumstances demand an officer's instant judgment, even precipitate
recklessness fails to inch close enough ... to spark the shock that

implicates 'the large concerns of the governors and the governed."" 5
Accordingly, the Court held that "high-speed chases with no intent to
harm suspects physically or to worsen their legal plight do not give rise
to liability under the Fourteenth Amendment, redressible by an action
under § 1983. "151
PRIOR INSTANCES OF THE USE OF DEADLY FORCE DURING
PURSUITS
Smith v.Freland,'52 the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals deter-

V.

In
mined that summary judgment should be granted in favor of an officer
Springdale police
who used deadly force to terminate a pursuit.'
officer Peter Schulcz observed a car speed out of an apartment complex
and run a stop sign. The officer began pursuing the vehicle in an

148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id. (quoting Daniels, 474 U.S. at 332).
151. Id. at 854. At first glance, the way the Court phrases this holding seems to argue
against the position of this Comment. However, it must be remembered that the injury
inflicted in Sacramento occurred purely by accident. Id. at 844. Thus, because there was
no attempt at seizure, the Fourth Amendment is not implicated, and substantive due
process provides the correct framework in which to view the officer's actions. See Brower,
489 U.S. at 597; Campbell v. White, 916 F.2d 421, 423 (7th Cir. 1990) (determining no
seizure occurred when fleeing motorcyclist was accidentally struck and killed during chase);
Frye v. Akron, 759 F. Supp. 1320, 1324 (N.D. Ind. 1991) (holding that, because no Fourth
Amendment seizure took place, suit under substantive due process was proper when
motorcyclist was struck by patrol car during pursuit). However, if the injury had been
intentionally inflicted, the officer's actions would constitute a seizure. Hodari,499 U.S. at
626. In that case the correct analysis would be one of objective reasonableness. See
Graham, 490 U.S. at 395. In such a circumstance, "fa]n officer's evil intentions will not
make a Fourth Amendment violation out of an objectively reasonable use of force; nor will
an officer's good intentions make an objectively unreasonable use of force constitutional."
Id. at 397.
152. 954 F.2d 343 (6th Cir. 1992).
153. Id. at 347.
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attempt to stop it, but the driver, Smith, refused to pull over and

proceeded to lead the officer on a 2.6-mile chase at speeds in excess of
90 miles an hour. During the pursuit, Smith backed his car into a field.
Officer Schulcz, believing Smith was stuck, began to pull his patrol car
in front of Smith's vehicle in an attempt to block its escape. At that
point, Smith's car charged forward, swerving toward the officer's car.
Officer Schulcz jerked his patrol unit to the right to avoid a collision,
then tried to steer his unit in front of Smith's car again in another
attempt to block Smith's escape. Smith attempted to ram the officer's
vehicle a second time,
requiring the officer once again to take action to
154
avoid Smith's car.
As the chase proceeded into an adjacent town, an officer from the
Sharonville Police Department pulled her car across the road to block
Smith's progress. However, Smith had room to maneuver around her,
which he did, and Officer Schulcz continued his pursuit. Smith
eventually turned down a dead-end road, then attempted to turn his car
around when he reached the end of the street. Officer Schulcz again
tried to block Smith's escape, placing the nose of his patrol car against
the nose of Smith's car. Smith's vehicle was trapped by a building in the
rear and a fence to his left. Officer Schulcz got out of his patrol car and,
intending to remove Smith from the vehicle, circled around the rear of
his unit. Suddenly, Smith's car backed up, lunged forward, and crashed
into Schulcz's patrol car. Smith backed up again, then tried to speed
past the parked patrol unit, smashing into the fence on his left as he did
so. As Smith's car went past him, Officer Schulcz pulled his gun and
fired one shot through the passenger's side of the car. The bullet
travelled
through the passenger seat, then struck and killed Mr.
155
Smith.

Mr. Smith's mother brought suit on behalf of his estate, alleging
violations of Section 1983 and provisions of Ohio state law. 56 The
district court, while noting Officer Schulcz was not in personal danger
at the time the shooting occurred, nonetheless concluded "that a
'reasonable officer in those circumstances would certainly believe that if
Mr. Smith continued [the] escape attempt, he posed a significant threat
of physical injury to numerous others."' 57 It therefore determined
that Smith did not suffer any constitutional deprivation. Accordingly,
it dismissed the federal claim on that ground, as well as dismissing the
state claims on the ground that it no longer had jurisdiction over them.

154.
155.
156.
157.

Id. at 344.
Id.
Id. at 344-45.
Id. at 346.
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On appeal, Ms. Smith contended that Officer Schulcz's use of deadly
force was unnecessary, allegedly because a roadblock at the end of the
dead-end road would have prevented her son's escape. She also pointed
out to the court that Officer Schulcz's actions violated the Springdale
Police Department's policy regarding the use of deadly force. 5 '
The Sixth Circuit began its examination by noting the imprecise
nature of the test of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment. 5 9
Importantly, the court properly recognized that Graham requires the
judiciary to avoid playing the role of a Monday morning quarterback.' ° It explicitly stated:
[W]e must avoid substituting our personal notions of proper police
procedure for the instantaneous decision of the officer at the scene. We
must never allow the theoretical, sanitized world of our imagination to
replace the dangerous and complex world that policemen face every
day. What constitutes "reasonable" action may seem quite different to
someone facing a possible assailant than to someone analyzing the
question at leisure. '
The court then addressed Ms. Smith's contention that the roadblock
supposedly in existence at the entrance to the dead-end road made
Officer Schulcz's use of dcadly force unwarranted.'62 It cited the Fifth
Circuit's decision in Reese v. Anderson 63 for the common-sense proposi64
tion that a surrounded suspect can still present a danger to others.
In Reese, after a high-speed chase, a policeman shot and killed one of the
occupants of the vehicle when the subject put his hands below the
officer's line of sight on at least two occasions, contrary to the officer's
verbal commands for all the occupants to raise their hands.'65 Plaintiff argued the officer's actions were not justified in light of an eyewitness's account that the car containing the suspects was surrounded.' 66
The Fifth Circuit rejected this proposition, holding the use of deadly
force was justified because the officer reasonably could have believed the
suspect "had retrieved a gun and was about to shoot."16 7 In the Fifth
158. Id. at 345-46. The Department's policy forbade officers from firing at moving
vehicles, except in cases of self-defense, and also prohibited the use of deadly force to
apprehend a misdemeanant. Id. at 346.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 347.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. 926 F.2d 494 (5th Cir. 1991).
164. Smith, 954 F.2d at 347.

165. 926 F.2d at 496.
166. Id. at 499.
167. Id. at 501.
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Circuit's view, "[tihe fact that the vehicle was 'totally surrounded' [did]
not change" this conclusion because the suspect's "actions alone could
[have] cause[d] a reasonable officer to fear imminent and serious
physical harm."'68 From this conclusion, the court in Smith reasoned
that
[a]fter a dramatic chase, Officer Schulcz appeared to have trapped his
man at the end of a dark street. Suddenly Mr. Smith freed his car and
began speeding down the street. In an instant Officer Schulcz had to
decide whether to allow his suspect to escape. He decided to stop him,
and no jury could say he acted unreasonably.'69
The court therefore dismissed Ms. Smith's argument that a roadblock
precluded Officer Schulcz's use of force, noting that "even if there were
a roadblock at the end of [the dead-end street], Officer Schulcz could
reasonably believe that Mr. Smith could escape the roadblock, as he had
escaped several times previously."' 7 ° It also recognized that Smith
would have posed a danger to the officers manning the roadblock if it
had been set up as alleged because "[e]ven unarmed, [Smith] was not
harmless; a car can be a deadly weapon."'71 Thus, the court concluded
72
that summary judgment should be granted to the officer.'
In regard to Ms. Smith's argument that Officer Schulcz's violation of
department policy should carry some weight, the court explained that
the sole question under Section 1983 was whether the officer violated the
Constitution, not whether he should be disciplined by his department.'7 It noted that "[a] city can certainly choose to hold its officers
to a higher standard than that required by the Constitution without
74
The court
being subjected to increased liability under § 1983."'
recognized that to reach a different conclusion "would encourage all
75
Thus,
governments to adopt the least restrictive policies possible."'
76
1
irrelevant.
simply
as
violation
policy
the court viewed the officer's
The decision in Smith provides an excellent example of a court which
understands that a certain degree of deference should be given to an
officer's judgment when the events unfolding around the officer call for
decisive action. Similar deference was shown by the Eighth Circuit

168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.

Id.
954 F.2d at 347.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 348.
Id.
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There, a trucker in Bonner
Court of Appeals in Cole v. Bone.'
Springs, Kansas, drove his eighteen-wheeler through a toll booth without
stopping to pay the toll. A Kansas state trooper began pursuing the
truck, which continued into Kansas City, Missouri. Officers from the
city police department took over the pursuit as the truck sped through
the city at speeds exceeding ninety miles an hour. About twenty miles
Missouri State Highway Patrol joined
into the state, troopers from the
v
the chase along Interstate 70.'7
Two troopers, Rice and Martinez, maneuvered their vehicles in front
of the truck, one officer in each lane, and attempted to execute a rolling
This maneuver failed, however, because the driver
roadblock."7 9
accelerated whenever the troopers slowed down. After the rolling
roadblock failed, Trooper Messick, who had been behind the truck, pulled
alongside it and fired his shotgun at the truck's tires in an attempt to
disable the vehicle. This action succeeded in flattening one tire, but the
truck continued along on its remaining tires. Subsequently, each time
Messick tried to get close to the truck to fire again, the suspect swerved
the vehicle towards the trooper's car.'
The corporal in charge then ordered a stationary roadblock be set up
on the interstate. Three additional troopers arranged their cars in the
passing lane in an attempt to funnel the truck into a single lane, leaving
only one path for the truck to take should the suspect try to run the
roadblock. Unsurprisingly, the suspect did use this avenue to avoid the
roadblock, which he could see from half a mile away. The troopers fired
at the trucks's tires and radiator as it sped past them, but this action
only succeeded in destroying a tire on one of the two rear axles, and the
truck continued down the interstate at over ninety miles an hour.
Throughout the pursuit, Troopers Rice and Martinez remained in front
of the truck, clearing the congested July 4th traffic from' its path. Their
than one hundred cars
efforts notwithstanding, the suspect forced more
81
off the road during the course of the chase.'
Based on the suspect's demonstrated lack of concern for the safety of
those on the road, Trooper Rice decided to use deadly force to stop the

177. 993 F.2d 1328 (8th Cir. 1993).
178. 'Id. at 1330.
179. A "rolling roadblock" is a precision maneuver that involves boxing in a pursued
vehicle with police cars and slowing down in front of it in an attempt to make the suspect
stop. Because of the very real possibility of being rammed by the suspect's vehicle, this
tactic is risky. Its success depends upon several factors, some of which are totally
unpredictable. Among these are the suspect's unwillingness to damage the vehicle he is
driving, his desire not to risk injury in a collision, and his ability to drive.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 1330-31.
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pursuit. Six miles after the truck sped through the stationary roadblock,
he observed the freeway was momentarily clear of civilian traffic. After
radioing his intent to the others, Trooper Rice, who was still in front of
the truck, used a shotgun to shoot out the rear window of his patrol car,
then drew his pistol and fired two rounds at the truck. The suspect was
struck in the forehead and later died at an area hospital. The suspect's
family brought suit under Section 1983 and alleged several constitutional violations. The troopers moved for summary judgment, arguing they
were entitled to qualified immunity. The district court denied the
motion, and an interlocutory appeal followed."8 2
Because the threshold question in a qualified immunity defense is
whether there has even been a constitutional violation, the Eighth
Circuit proceeded to examine plaintiffs' allegations.1 3 While plaintiffs
alleged numerous constitutional violations in their complaint, the court,
pursuant to Graham, stated that "the gravamen of their action [was]
that the officers involved ... unreasonably seized [the suspect] in
violation of the Fourth Amendment."1' 4 Citing Hodari and Brower, the
court rejected plaintiffs' contention that the suspect was seized during
either the rolling or stationary roadblocks.'8 5 The court also dismissed
the idea that the shots which were fired at the truck, but which did not
hit the suspect, were seizures. 8 The court correctly characterized all
of these actions as mere assertions of authority because they were not
submitted to nor did they cause the suspect to stop.8 7 Thus, the court
held that the suspect was not seized until he was struck by Trooper
Rice's bullet.'
In accord with Graham, the court then examined Trooper Rice's use
of force "from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene. " 89
It began by analyzing the danger presented to other motorists by the
pursuit. 9° First, it noted the trooper personally witnessed the suspect

182. Id. at 1331.
183. Id. at 1332; see also Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 232 (1991). In Siegert the

Court stated that "1a] necessary concomitant to the determination of whether the
constitutional right asserted by a plaintiff is 'clearly established' at the time the defendant
acted is the determination of whether a plaintiff has asserted a violation of a constitutional
right at all." Id.
184. Cole, 993 F.2d at 1332.
185. Id. at 1332-33 (citing Hodari, 499 U.S. at 627-29; Brower, 489 U.S. at 596-99).
186. Id. at 1333.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 1332.
189. Id.at 1333 (citing Graham, 490 U.S. at 396; Krueger v. Fuhr, 991 F.2d 435, 439
(8th Cir. 1993)).
'190. Id.
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force several vehicles off the roadway and threaten the safety of
numerous others. 191 Second, Rice knew the truck had "been careening
through traffic for at least fifty miles and that it showed no signs of
stopping." 192 Last, the trooper was aware that all previous attempts
at stopping the truck did not succeed. 93 Thus, Trooper Rice could
"reasonably have believed that the truck would continue to threaten the
lives of travelers as it continued speeding down the crowded interstate
highway."" For these reasons, the court held that the use of deadly
force to terminate the chase "was not objectively unreasonable."195
Additionally, the court separately noted Trooper Rice had "probable
cause to believe [the suspect] had committed a crime.""* Not only did
Rice receive information by radio that the truck's driver attempted to
force several Kansas City officers off the road, Rice believed the suspect
had intentionally tried to ram Trooper Martinez's vehicle, as well as his
own. 97 These actions by the suspect constituted first degree assault
under Missouri law. 98 Thus, in light of all the information Trooper
Rice was privy to, the court concluded his use of force "was constitutionally reasonable as a matter of law" and declined to consider the
applicability of qualified immunity to the case."
Of note is the court's acknowledgment that the trooper's "decision to
use deadly force might not have been the most prudent course of action;
other courses of action, such as another stationary roadblock, might
However, the Eighth Circuit
conceivably have been available.""'
recognized, as did the Sixth Circuit in Smith, that "[tihe Constitution
requires only that the seizure be objectively reasonable, not that the
officer pursue the most prudent course of conduct as judged by 20/20
hindsight."0 1 Accordingly, the Eighth Circuit remanded the case to

191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 1333-34.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 1334. At the time of the chase, Missouri law did not contain a provision
making the failure to stop for police, in general, a crime. See State v. Dossett, 851 S.W.2d
750, 752 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993). Since 1939, however, Missouri has deemed the failure to stop
for a member of the highway patrol a misdemeanor. See Mo. REV. STAT. § 43.170 (1992).
Interestingly, this provision was not discussed by the Eighth Circuit in Cole.
199. Cole, 993 F.2d at 1334.

200. Id.
201. Id. (citing Graham, 490 U.S. at 396; Krueger, 991 F.2d at 439).
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the district court with instructions to enter summary judgment for all
defendants. °2
20 3
Unlike Smith and Cole, a distinguishing feature in Dudley v. Eden
was the fleeing suspect's commission of a felony just prior to the
chase.20 4 In the hope of committing suicide, plaintiff planned "to rob
a bank, wait for the police, and then get shot by officers arriving at the
scene." 2 5 Accordingly, the unarmed plaintiff entered a bank in
Eastlake, Ohio, and demanded money from the teller. After receiving
the money, plaintiff drove his vehicle to the back of a nearby bar and
parked, awaiting the arrival of law enforcement. A bank employee
phoned police to report the robbery and plaintiff's location, which was
then broadcast by radio to officers responding to the scene. °6
Officer Lewis, the first on the scene, exited his car after spotting
plaintiff's vehicle and approached it on foot. As Lewis ordered plaintiff
out of the vehicle, two other officers arrived and surrounded plaintiff's
car. Because plaintiff refused to comply with the officers' orders to get
out of his car, the officers attempted to open the car's doors, but these
were locked. Officer Lewis then reached inside plaintiff's partially open
driver's side window and attempted to unlock the door. At this point
plaintiff accelerated and, apparently reconsidering the notion of "suicide
by cop," began driving out of the parking lot at a high speed. In
response, the officers on foot fired their weapons at plaintiff's tires in an
attempt to stop him.2 °7
As these events were unfolding, a fourth officer, Eden, pulled into the
parking lot and remained in his patrol car. When plaintiff attempted to
flee the parking lot, Officer Eden gave chase. He witnessed plaintiff
make a right turn out of the lot, bolt across both westbound lanes, cross
the double-yellow lines into the eastbound passing lane, then swerve
back into the westbound passing lane. Officer Eden pursued plaintiff,
ending up in the curb lane alongside plaintiff's vehicle. Officer Eden
attempted to cut off plaintiff's path with his patrol car, and the two cars
collided. As the cars slowed, Officer Eden fired three rounds out of his
driver's side window at plaintiff's windshield. Both cars came to a stop,
and plaintiff was taken into custody and transported to a local hospital,
where he received treatment for a gunshot wound to the shoulder. From

202.

Id.

203. 49 F. Supp. 2d 581 (N.D. Ohio 1999).
204.
205.
206.
207.

Id. at 583.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 583-84.
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the time the call was first dispatched to the time of the shooting, a mere
four minutes elapsed. 08
After plaintiff was sentenced he brought suit under Section 1983,
claiming excessive force was used during his arrest. The case came
before the District Court for the Northern District of Ohio on plaintiff's
motion for partial summary judgment and the police officers' motion for
summary judgment. 2 9 The court noted that under Garner, deadly
force may be used to stop a suspect's escape when the officer has
probable cause to believe the suspect presents a threat of death or
serious harm to the officer or others.1 0 Looking to Graham, the court
acknowledged "that '[tihe calculus of reasonableness"' in an excessive
force claim must be construed in a manner which makes allowance for
the split-second decisions law enforcement officers are often required to
make.2 11 The court then noted the short time span in which the events
occurred.212 It also noted that despite the radio broadcast informing
the officers that plaintiff was unarmed, Officer Eden "would have heard
shots being fired as [plaintiff] made his escape."2 13 It then reasoned
that (1) plaintiff's flight created danger for both pedestrians and
motorists; (2) his turn onto the highway gave reason for Eden to believe
plaintiff was escaping towards a major thoroughfare; and (3) there was
no way for Eden to be sure plaintiff "was either unarmed or nondangerous."214 To the court, these facts demonstrated Officer Eden
acted reasonably.2 5 Thus, it held Eden did not violate plaintiff's
Fourth Amendment rights. 1 6
Notwithstanding its holding, the court went on to conclude Eden
would be entitled to qualified immunity "based on the 'objective
reasonableness' of his actions, 'assessed in light of the legal rules"' in
place at the time, regardless of whether he had probable cause to believe

208.
209.
210.
211.

Id.
Id. at 583.
Id. at 586.
Id. (quoting Graham, 490 U.S. at 396) (alteration in original).

212. Id.
213. Id. This factor can be interpreted as justifying deadly force in several ways. First,
Eden may have thought some of the shots fired came from plaintiff. Second, he may have
believed they were fired in response to a direct threat presented by plaintiff. Lastly, the
fact that the shots fired at plaintiffs tires failed to stop plaintiff may make it reasonable
to think nothing short of deadly force would induce plaintiff to stop. While unclear from
the court's language, it seems likely the court intended the latter interpretation because
nothing in the opinion addresses purely defensive uses of deadly force.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 587.
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plaintiff "posed a threat of serious physical harm."2 7"
The court
acknowledged plaintiffs right not to be subjected to excessive force "was
clearly established under Garner and its progeny."2 18 However, in the
court's view it could not "seriously be said that a reasonable officer in
Eden's position 'would have known that shooting the victim was
unreasonable under the circumstances. '' 21 9 Thus, the court noted that
any mistake on Eden's part regarding plaintiff's dangerousness was a
reasonable mistake to have made, and it recognized that such mistakes
22
are exactly what are protected from suit by qualified immunity.
In Scott v. Clay County, Tennessee, 221 the Sixth Circuit again upheld
an officer's use of deadly force to stop a fleeing vehicle.222 Unlike in
Smith and Cole, however, the officer's shots hit a passenger in the
vehicle, a passenger of whose presence the officer was unaware. 223 The
events began when Robert Scott, under the influence of alcohol and
drugs, got into an argument with his equally impaired wife while driving
on a country road in Tennessee. Deputy Michael Thompson observed the
car run a stop sign and veer off the road as it made a turn at an
intersection. After making the turn and accelerating, the suspect's car
narrowly missed Sheriff Chinn Anderson's unmarked car, which
happened to be parked on the same road. Deputy Thompson then
engaged his lights and siren to initiate a traffic stop. The suspect sped
up and a twenty-minute chase ensued, during the course of which
Deputy Thompson was joined by Sheriff Anderson and Deputy Billy
Pierce. As the chase proceeded, the suspect forced at least one civilian
motorist off the highway and drove across the road's centerline.224
Reaching speeds up to one hundred miles an hour, Scott finally lost
control of his Chevrolet Caprice when he attempted to negotiate a turn
at approximately seventy-five miles an hour. After the car crashed into
the guardrail and came to a halt, Deputy Pierce pulled in behind the
suspect.225 Pierce exited his car, drew his sidearm, and cautiously
approached the Caprice. The vehicle suddenly charged forward, causing

217.
218.
219.

Id. (quoting Anderson, 483 U.S. at 639).
Id.
Id. (quoting Sova v. City of Mt. Pleasant, 142 F.3d 898, 903 (6th Cir. 1998)).

220. Id.
221. 205 F.3d 867 (6th Cir. 2000).
222. Id. at 878.
223. Id. at 873.
224. Id. at 872.
225. Id. At some point during this time a collision occurred between the suspect's car
and Deputy Pierce's patrol car. The suspect claimed Deputy Pierce crashed into his vehicle
from behind, while Pierce claimed the supect backed into his car after he exited it.
Regardless, the collision was not a factor in the court's decision. See id.
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Pierce to leap out of its way to avoid being struck. Then, in an apparent
attempt to get back on the road, the suspect drove his car directly
toward Deputy Thompson's approaching patrol car.226
Believing the suspect had earlier attempted to run down Sheriff
Anderson, as well as himself, and that the suspect's continued flight
posed an immediate risk of harm to the other officers and the public,
Deputy Pierce fired five rounds at the suspect and another four rounds
at the vehicle's tires. The Caprice skidded to a halt, and Robert Scott
emerged unharmed. His wife Patricia, however, whose presence was
unknown to all the officers involved, had been struck by two of Deputy
Pierce's rounds. Both subjects were removed from the vehicle and
handcuffed. When Mrs. Scott's injuries were discovered, she was
transported to a nearby hospital where she underwent surgery for
gunshot wounds to the head and shoulder.22 v
Patricia Scott subsequently brought a Section 1983 action and pendent
state law claims against the officers and the county, arguing her rights
under the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments were violated.
Defendants moved for summary judgment, asserting that plaintiff's
constitutional rights were not violated and that qualified immunity
barred the suit regardless of whether or not plaintiff did suffer
constitutional injury.228 The district court denied defendants' motion,
ruling that material issues of fact existed regarding the reasonableness
of the seizure and "whether the precise contributing actions of each
individual defendant were objectively unreasonable under the dictates
of law" clearly established at the time.229 Thus, the district court
deemed these to be proper matters for jury resolution, whereupon
defendants appealed.23
The Sixth Circuit noted the district court assumed plaintiff's claim
would be governed by the Fourth Amendment's "objective unreasonableness" standard, which was more favorable to plaintiff than the FourOn appeal,
teenth Amendment's "shocks the conscience" test.2" 1
defendants conceded their motion should be assessed in light of the
Fourth Amendment, rather than the Fourteenth. 32 This concession
appears to have been an excellent legal tactic on defendants' part. It
rendered unnecessary a review of "whether a factual issue would

226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 872-73.
at 873-74.
at 874.
at 876.
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otherwise exist for trial regarding whether, at the time Pierce discharged
his weapon into the moving [Caprice's] passenger compartment, the
defendants intended to seize any passenger in that vehicle other than
the driver, which in turn would determine which constitutional"
standard governed plaintiff's claims. 23 Thus, defendants' concession
allowed the Sixth Circuit to dispose of plaintiff's Section 1983 claims on
appeal, rather than remand them to the district court for determination
of whether the officers intended to seize any passenger present in the
vehicle.23 4
Before its analysis, the court listed the three Graham factors for
determining the reasonableness of an officer's use of force: (1) the
severity of the crime, (2) whether the suspect presents a danger to the
officer or others, and (3) whether the suspect is resisting arrest or
attempting to evade arrest by flight.2 35 It explained that, while the
test of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment is mostly factdriven, summary judgment grounded in qualified immunity in favor of
public servants "is nonetheless appropriate when the undisputed
material facts, or the plaintiff's version of disputed material facts,
demonstrate that a hypothetical reasonable officer would not have
known that his actions, under the circumstances, were objectively
unreasonable."236 The court noted that, even when the record of events
was construed most favorably for plaintiff, all three factors from Graham
"militated in support of the incontrovertable conclusion that the
defendants' actions were objectively reasonable."" 7
Regarding the first factor, the court noted the officers themselves had
witnessed the suspect commit "serious, life-threatening crimes." 238 As
for the third factor, it noted the suspect "was actively resisting arrest by
eluding representatives of the criminal justice system."23 9 Showing
remarkable insight in this context, the court additionally recognized that
the suspect's "persistent high-risk attempts to evade capture created an
objectively reasonable suspicion that he may have perpetrated unknown
additional serious offenses, thereby reinforcing the weight of the first
'reasonableness' factor as supporting [Deputy] Pierce's actions."240 Yet
its treatment of the second Graham factor truly sets the Sixth Circuit

233.
234.

Id. at 876 n.15.
Id. at 880.

235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.

Id. at 877.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 877 n.17.
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apart. Initially, the court reasoned the facts "demonstrated that the
fleeing motorist's ongoing felonious misconduct posed an immediate
threat to the safety of officers as well as innocent civilians," thus
satisfying the second Graham factor.241 After citing Garner, however,
the court also noted the evidence before it "would warrant a reasonable
officer in Pierce's circumstances to conclude that the culprit posed a
serious risk of injury to others, which, standing alone, reconciled his use
of force with Fourth Amendment strictures."242 With this statement,
the Sixth Circuit became the first court of appeals explicitly to recognize
the constitutionality of using deadly force to terminate a chase that
presents a danger solely to the public.
After reviewing its previous decision in Smith, the court concluded
Deputy Pierce's actions did not violate the Fourth Amendment because
they were objectively reasonable.243 In the court's view, the deputy did
nothing more than "permissibly discharge[] his professional duty to
restore and maintain lawful order through the most effective instrumentality available, namely gunfire."244 Because "Pierce justifiably fired
at the fleeing vehicle in order to seize its occupant(s)," the court
reasoned his actions "could not violate the Fourth Amendment rights of
any unknown passenger who may have been injured by his actions."24 5
The court thus concluded that Pierce and the other deputies were
entitled to qualified immunity and that the claim against the county was
likewise defeated by the lack of a constitutional injury.246 Accordingly,
the court ordered all Section 1983 claims against the defendant officers
and county be dismissed.247
VI.

THE PROPER APPROACH

A.

The Threat Presented
The initial consideration of deadly force in the context of high-speed
pursuits should be governed by an examination of the danger presented
by the suspect's flight. As noted in Part II, however, the available
statistical data must be viewed with a measure of caution.248 The
table below summarizes this data for easy reference:

241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.

Id. at 877.
Id. at 877 n.16 (emphasis added).
Id. at 878.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 878-79.
Id. at 880.
See supra text accompanying notes 64-66.
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Agency
California HP
Minnesota POST
Minnesota HP
Illinois
Dade County
Omaha PD

Accident Rate
29%
40%
70%
39%
38%
32%

Injury Rate
11%
27%
24%
11%
17%
14%

1631
Death Rate
1%
.001%
N/A
1.7%
.7%
N/A

Several points seem clear. First, the studies reveal that approximately
one-third of all chases end in collisions. Second, approximately 20% of
chases end with injuries inflicted upon someone. Finally, and most
surprising to the author, is the relatively low death rate which these
studies illustrate. Notwithstanding this low statistic, it should be
remembered this percentage can still represent a significant number of
people when applied nationwide. It is estimated that more than 50,000
police chases occur in this country each year.249 If the 1% figure holds
true, approximately 500 people every year die during the course of
pursuits. Within specific geographic regions, the danger may be even
greater. For example, in Houston, Texas, alone, eleven people were
killed during pursuits conducted in 1994.260
In short, the studies show what logic and common sense dictate:
When a person flees in a vehicle from law enforcement officers, that
person presents to others a threat of death or serious bodily harm.
Under Garner,the accepted rule is that "[wihere the officer has probable
cause to believe that the suspect poses a threat of serious physical harm,
either to the officer or to others, it is not constitutionally unreasonable
to prevent escape by using deadly force." 2 1' Notwithstanding the low
death rate associated with high speed chases, the fact that one-fifth will
result in injuries, and some will result in death, indicates the "threat"
of serious physical harm is present during these chases. Therefore,
under this reading of Garner,deadly force may be used to terminate that
threat and stop the escape.
Some may contend more is required by citing the following from the
Court's opinion: "[Deadly] force may not be used unless it is necessary
to prevent the escape and the officer has probable cause to believe that
the suspect poses a significant threat of death or serious physical injury

249. Dateline (NBC television broadcast, Dec. 12, 1999).
250. Alpert, supra note 1, at 623-24.
251. Garner, 471 U.S. at 11. The phrase "accepted rule" is used in light of the view
that the Court's language here is nothing more than dicta, something which has
occasionally been overlooked. Compare id. at 31-32 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) with Dudley,
49 F. Supp. 2d at 586 (denoting phrase as Court's holding).
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to the officer or others."" 2 But this assertion may be easily countered
in two ways. First, the Court made this statement after phrasing the
task before it as the determination of the "constitutionality of the use of
deadly force to prevent the escape of an apparently unarmed suspected
felon."2 51 It then answered its own question with the "significant
threat" sentence, but began it with: "We conclude that such force may
not be used unless .
2..."54Thus, the clear implication of the Court is
that an unarmed fleeing felon may be stopped with deadly force only if
he presents a "significant threat of death or serious physical injury,"2 55
while an armed felon need only "pose[] a threat of serious physical
injury" before' deadly force may be constitutionally used to prevent his
escape.25 Needless to say, a suspect who flees in an automobile has a
two thousand-pound weapon at his fingertips. 257 Therefore, the lower
standard should apply to govern vehicular pursuits.
Second, in the context of all felons, the majority later noted that
"[wihere the suspect poses no immediate threat to the officers and no
threat to others, the harm resulting from failing to apprehend him does
not justify the use of deadly force."258 While the term "immediate" is
used here to modify the kind of threat to police officers that can justify
deadly force, there is no similar modification of "threat[s] to others."
Thus, the Court's language suggests the harm resulting from failing to
apprehend a suspect who presents an immediate threat to officers or
some threat to others may justify killing him. Therefore, this portion of
the Court's opinion contradicts the "significant threat" language it used
previously.5 9
However, the argument that an immediate danger to others need not
be present before deadly force is used should be limited exclusively to
counter those who contend Garnerrequires a significant threat of harm.
In the face of the Court's statement in Graham that "whether the
suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others"
should play a role in assessing the reasonableness of a particular use of
force, it is clear something more than a mere possibility of harm to
others is required. 260 Yet in the context of a high-speed pursuit, when
at any second the circumstances surrounding the chase may drastically
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.

Garner,471 U.S. at 3 (emphasis added).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 11.
See Smith, 954 F.2d at 347 (noting "a car can be a deadly weapon").
Garner, 471 U.S. at 11.
Id. at 3.
Graham, 490 U.S. at 396 (citing Garner, 471 U.S. at 8-9).
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alter, the concept of an "immediate threat" is hard to define. While the
level of immediacy certainly must vary according to the circumstances
of the chase, it is difficult to accept the idea that a speeding vehicle,
recklessly driven on a road occupied by others, does not present an
immediate threat of harm to those people, if not actual immediate
danger.
Anytime someone flees from the police in an automobile there is an
immediate threat to members of the public, both motorists and
pedestrians alike, if they occupy, or even if they may at some point
occupy, the road on which the chase is occurring.26 A similar danger
is presented to the pursuing officers because of the risk that an accident
will occur.262 For those who reject this notion, another way to view the
danger presented is to envision a spectrum wherein the least immediate
danger is found on a deserted country road late at night, and the most
immediate danger is found as a speeding suspect barrels towards a
controlled intersection occupied with vehicles.6 3 Somewhere within
this spectrum lies the pursued suspect on a two-lane highway who
passes those in front of him without regard to oncoming traffic and the
suspect who flees at a high rate of speed,
but not recklessly, if one
2 64
grants that such a person can even exist.
B. The Threat Presented Is the Only Relevant Factor in Deciding
Whether Deadly Force Is Justified
The application of deadly force to stop a high-speed pursuit should be
judged solely with reference to the danger presented by the suspect's
flight. Under Garner, a required element in deciding whether the
application of deadly force is proper is an assessment of whether the
force was necessary to prevent the suspect's escape.265 Under Graham,
however, flight to avoid arrest is only one factor in the overall consideration of the force applied.266 Graham provides the correct view because in a car chase, the flight element is inevitably secondary to the
danger element, even though the two are inextricably linked. In a high-

261. See supra text accompanying note 40; see also Haynes, 883 S.W.2d at 608; Dudley,
49 F. Supp. 2d at 586.
262. The accident may arise from a mechanical failure of the officer's car, from a
mistake on the officer's part that results in a collision, or from the actions of a third party
who becomes entangled in the pursuit.

263. See City of Pinellas Park v. Brown, 604 So. 2d 1222, 1224 (Fla. 1992).
264. Obviously, a person who speeds away from the police with the intent of getting
away, but with the fervent desire not to hurt anyone in the process, still presents a threat
to others on the road.
265. 471 U.S. at 11; accord Brower, 884 F.2d at 1318.
266. 490 U.S. at 396.
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speed pursuit, the very manner of flight presents the danger, yet it is
the danger presented that provides the reason for using deadly force.
Thus, a suspect who flees toward a major highway presents an increased
threat because of the likelihood a greater number of people will be
exposed to the dangers presented by the chase.267 Similarly, the
"severity of the crime" factor announced in Graham should be viewed as
secondary to the danger element because the crime itself can only be a
justification for using deadly force when the crime and danger elements
are so linked as to be indistinguishable.2 "' To illustrate these propositions, consider the following examples.
A patrolman tries to stop Suspect A because Suspect A's vehicle has
a headlight out. Suspect A refuses to pull over but does not speed up,
drive recklessly, or otherwise take any action that could be dangerous to
others. He stops at all intersections and properly yields the right-of-way
when required to do so, but drives carefully around all police roadblocks
put before him. In these circumstances, the police really have a limited
course of action available. They can try rolling roadblocks, follow the
suspect until he runs out of gas, or attempt to place stopsticks in his
path in an effort to end the chase.269 Regardless, it is impossible to see
a reason for using deadly force to stop Suspect A because little, if any,
danger is presented by his flight or by his equipment violation. They are
simply irrelevant.
On the other hand, when the same patrolman "bluelights" Suspect B
for having a headlight out, Suspect B accelerates. He passes vehicles on
a road with double yellow lines, runs red lights without regard for
oncoming traffic, and generally drives like a man possessed. Finally, as
he goes around a police roadblock, an officer fires a shotgun at Suspect
B's windshield. Regardless of whether one believes the officer is justified
in shooting the suspect, it is certainly true the headlight violation alone
cannot support the officer's action. It is possible that the suspect's flight
can, but only because of the threat of harm posed by the manner of the
flight. Thus, the danger element inevitably has priority over the flight
element.
Finally, consider the patrolman who tries to stop Suspect C, an
escaped serial murderer convicted for killing ten people. Suspect C acts
exactly like Suspect A in that he drives safely, with due regard for those
around him. Like Suspect A, Suspect C simply refuses to pull over. As

267. See Dudley, 49 F. Supp. 2d at 586 (pointing to suspect's escape towards a "major
thoroughfare" as a factor in deciding whether the officer was justified in using deadly
force).
268. 490 U.S. at 396.
269. See discussion of the inadequacy of stopsticks infra Part IX.
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Suspect C drives slowly around a patrol car in the road, an officer fires
through the driver's window and kills C. A rational justification for this
action would be something like, "We just couldn't take the chance that
he might get away from us. The officer saw the opportunity to stop him
and took it. Suspect C would probably have killed again." Regardless
of whether one believes this proffered reason justifies the force used, it
is clear that the only logical justification that can be offered for shooting
Suspect C is the threat of subsequent danger presented to his unknown,
future victims. Thus, the overall danger presented is ultimately the
reason for the action, not just the suspect's crimes nor the nature of his
flight. The flight and crime elements merely combine to form the
element of danger.
An additional reason why the "severity of the crime" factor should be
treated secondarily is that a chase always involves at least two crimes:
(1) the predicate offense for which the stop was initiated and (2) the
suspect's attempt to flee. ° As noted above, the predicate offense will
provide a justification for deadly force only if the suspect's escape would
endanger the public, but this circumstance is properly viewed as a
danger element. In recognizing the crime as a factor in the reasonableness of a particular use of force, however, the Court provides a tempting
argument to those who might contend deadly force should not be used
to stop suspects who flee in automobiles. There are states that treat
flight in a vehicle as a misdemeanor.27 1 It might be argued that if
these states view pursuits so lightly as to give their perpetrators
misdemeanant status, then evidently these crimes are not serious
enough to warrant using deadly force to end the pursuits. The common
law rule that deadly force cannot be used to seize a misdemeanant might
also be cited here. 2
But these arguments entirely miss the point.
The manner in which the predicate offense of fleeing is punished, and a
traditionally unavailable method of apprehending a certain class of
criminals, have no bearing at all upon the risk of danger presented by
the suspect's flight in a vehicle. It is the potential for injury and death
to innocent parties that provides the justification for using deadly force,
rather than the status of the offense itself.27 3 The offense is relevant
only when the threat of danger is increased, such as when the suspect

270. See Mays v. City of East St. Louis, 123 F.3d 999, 1002 (7th Cir. 1997).
271. See, e.g., Mo. REV. STAT. § 575.150 (Supp. 2001) (resisting by flight a Class A
misdemeanor); S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-5-750 (Supp. 2000) (first offense a misdemeanor); CAL.
VEH. CODE § 2800.1 (West 2000) (flight without causing death or bodily harm a
misdemeanor).
272. See 5 AM. JUR. 2d Arrest § 111 (1995).
273. See Scott, 205 F.3d at 877 n.16.
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tries to sideswipe or ram pursuing vehicles. For example, in Cole the
Eighth Circuit recognized that the suspect's attempts to ram officers and
force them off the road constituted first degree assault under state law,
and this recognition played a role in the court's finding that the trooper's actions were justified.2" 4 This conclusion makes eminent sense.
Because the threat of danger in these circumstances is increased, there
is a corresponding increase in the justification for using deadly force to
stop the threat.

VII.

PROBLEMS WITH THE VIOLENT-FELON-ONLY POLICY

Some who consider the topic of police pursuits use the "threat to
others" component from Garner and Graham to contend that chases
should be limited to violent felons only.27 ' The belief is, evidently, that
by limiting chases to violent suspects, the overall pursuit rate will
decrease, and fewer innocent people will be injured. This view has
interesting implications, especially when urged by courts. In City of
Pinellas Park v. Brown, 276 the Florida Supreme Court commented that
"[what is required is for police to use reasonable means in light of the
nature of the offense and threats to safety involved. For example, a
high-speed chase is likely to be justifiable if its object is a gang of armed
and violent felons who probably will harm others."27 7 Is it any less a
tragedy when an innocent person is injured or killed in the course of a
pursuit when the suspect is a known murderer? The court evidently
believes this sort of event would be more "justifiable," although its use
of the term "likely" illustrates even this determination is not certain.
The problem is that the court embraces the notion that it is acceptable
to risk the lives of innocent people, i.e., by engaging in a pursuit, to
capture one bad guy, but not another.
Consider the following hypothetical situation: The police pursue a
man who is known to have killed his wife. As the suspect runs a red
light, he crashes into a car and kills the two occupants. If confronted
with this scenario, would the Florida Supreme Court engage in an
analysis of how many people the murderer could be expected to kill in
the future and compare this figure to the two occupants killed? If the
murderer had killed only his wife in a fit of rage, and was therefore
unlikely to kill again, presumably the police would be found to have
acted unreasonably and would be held liable. But if the wife was the

274.

993 F.2d at 1333-34.

275. See, e.g., Jensen, supra note 3, at 1278; ALPERT & FRIDELL, supra note 4, at 115.
276. 604 So. 2d 1222 (1992).
277. Id. at 1227.
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suspect's fourth murder victim of the day, would the court then
determine the police acted reasonably? This conclusion can only be
arrived at by determining that the deaths of the two innocent motorists
are a reasonable price to pay for the murderer's capture. Yet this
proposition is always incorrect. In this situation, the more appropriate
question is why the police did not stop the suspect, with deadly force or
otherwise, before he had an opportunity to kill with his vehicle.
Another problem with the violent-felon-only policy is that it encourages lawlessness. Word that the police in a certain community cannot
chase will invariably get out into the general public, and especially into
the criminal population."' Once this happens, few will pull over when
directed to do so.279 Yet one expert on the subject of pursuits has
argued that restricting pursuits to violent felons does not hinder law
enforcement's ability to perform such mundane tasks as traffic enforcement or cause an increase in violations of the law.2"' This argument
flies in the face of the most elementary logic, and real-world experience
demonstrates Professor Alpert's propositions are flawed. The Omaha
Police Department has experienced several different chase policies,
including a violent-felon-only policy.2"' While this policy was in place,
it became essentially pointless for an officer to attempt a traffic stop
because a scant numbcr of people pulled over when directed to do so.282
The result 2was
a feeling of immense frustration throughout the
3
department.
The policy change finally occurred in 1994 as a result of a series of
events that took place throughout the city. As part of their initiation,
gang members became required to steal vehicles and drive them past
parked patrol cars. The gang members knew they would not be chased,
and because of the "violent-felon only" policy they were not. The officers
could only watch quietly as up to five stolen cars in a row proceeded past
them, driven by gang members who gave the officers "the finger" as they
drove by. Eventually, the gang members became bored with this ritual
and began ramming patrol cars with the stolen vehicles. When this
activity started occurring, officers pursued the stolen vehicles and
started shooting at their occupants. The rammings stopped, and the city

278. Whether this information is communicated through the officers themselves, or
through others, is immaterial. Few things are as efficient as the jailhouse grapevine.
279. See Mays, 123 F.3d at 1003 (noting "if police are forbidden to pursue, then many
more suspects will flee").
280. Telephone Interview with Geoffrey Alpert, Professor of Criminal Justice,
University of South Carolina (October 17, 2000).
281. See supra note 61.
282. See supra note 63.
283. Id.
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These incidents offer proof of

Circuit Judge Easterbrook's statement that "[1]ax law enforcement
emboldens criminals and leads to more crime."2" 5
VIII.

IMPLICATIONS

The experience in Omaha illustrates why police must have the option
to chase available to them. Using deadly force to stop pursuits is simply
a way to decrease the risks presented to innocent persons. It allows
officers not only to prevent harm to others, but also to take a criminal
into custody. Thus,' its use should be encouraged.2"' Like all other
tasks confronting law enforcement, the application of deadly force must
be guided by the officer's ability and judgment. Consideration must be
given to what will become of the target vehicle after the driver ceases to
control it. Obviously, deadly force should be used only when the target
vehicle will cause a minimum amount of danger to civilians in the area,
such as when Trooper Rice waited for civilian traffic to clear before using
two pistol rounds to stop a transfer truck that was fleeing at over ninety
miles an hour.28 7 Yet its use in the pursuit context should not increase
the liability risk for officers. Consider the following:
Situation A: An officer is called to arrest a shoplifter at a mall. As
the officer approaches the suspect outside the mall, the suspect pulls a
pistol and holds it down by his side. Instantaneously, the officer draws
his weapon and yells for the suspect to drop the pistol. The suspect
raises the pistol, and the officer, fearing for his life, fires at the suspect.
A bullet enters the mall behind the suspect and hits a civilian whom the
officer could not see. Because of the discretionary nature of the act, the
officer should be protected from a state tort action under the doctrine of
governmental immunity.2"' Likewise, because of the reasonableness
of his actions, the officer should also be protected from constitutional
liability under the constitutional qualified immunity doctrine.28 9
Situation B: As the officer approaches the suspect, the suspect pulls
his pistol, and the officer again draws down on him and tells the suspect

284. See supra note 61.
285. Mays, 123 F.3d at 104.
286. As noted by Justice Scalia, "Street pursuits always place the public at some risk,
and compliance with police orders to stop should therefore be encouraged." Hodari, 499
U.S. at 627.
287. See Cole, 993 F.2d at 1331.
288. 63 C.J.S. Mun. Corporations § 495a (1999) ("A police officer is entitled to be
protected by official or governmental immunity for injuries resulting from discretionary
conduct, including the negligent infliction of harm arising therefrom .....
289. See Fraire,957 F.2d at 1273.
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to drop his weapon. Instead of raising his pistol, the suspect proceeds
to move toward the entrance to the mall. The officer is now faced with
a difficult choice. If he lets the suspect enter the mall, it is going to put
the suspect into proximity with a larger number of people. Thus, their
lives will be at increased risk. Not only will those inside be closer to any
gunplay that might occur, they also become potential hostages. Yet at
the instant moment, the suspect presents no true danger to anyone
because he is merely holding the pistol and moving toward the entrance
to the mall. Thus, it is accurate to say the suspect presents a threat of
danger to the customers inside. Would you shoot the suspect? If so, the
seizure is clearly a constitutional one because of the danger presented
to those inside.290 Further, if the officer fired, his action should be
protected under both constitutional qualified immunity and state
governmental immunity, regardless of whether an innocent third party
was injured.2 9'
But even Situation B does not accurately reflect the danger presented
by a high-speed pursuit because the mechanism by which harm will
come (the bullet's flight) is not in place, while in a pursuit the suspect's
vehicle is already moving, and that moving vehicle is the mechanism
which will cause injury. Thus, in Situation C, the suspect flees into the
mall as he sees the officer approaching, and the officer gives chase on
foot. Once within the mall, the suspect pulls his pistol and starts firing
completely at random. After five steps, a shot is discharged at the
ceiling. Ten more steps, a bullet heads off to the suspect's right. Five
more, the bullet ricochets off the ground just ahead of the suspect.
Situation C parallels the random danger and other factors present in
a high-speed pursuit. First, the suspect in Situation C may or may not
have any intent to harm anyone. Yet his actions clearly endanger those
around him. The same can be said for a suspect who recklessly flees in
a vehicle.
Second, if the officer in the hypothetical quits chasing the suspect, the
suspect may stop shooting or he may not. If an officer in a vehicle
pursuit quits chasing the suspect, the suspect may slow down and start
driving safely, or he may pull over some distance ahead, or he may do
neither. Few would suggest the officer should voluntarily quit chasing
the shoplifter in the mall, even though the manner of the suspect's
escape is dangerous and the predicate offense of shoplifting may be
viewed as relatively minor. This would remain true even if the
shoplifter shouted, "I'll quit shooting if you quit chasing me!" The
obvious next step for the officer is to attempt to shoot the fleeing

290. See Clay, 205 F.3d at 877 n.16.
291. See supra notes 288-89.
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suspect. Voluntary termination by the officer should be considered only
if he cannot safely fire at the suspect. This is because, as in a vehicle
pursuit, it is the officer's duty to stop the suspect while at the same time
protecting the public. Yet "protecting the public" does not automatically
mean letting the suspect go. In both cases, the dangerousness of the
suspects' flights provides all the more reason for their capture, whether
the captures come about through the use of deadly force or otherwise.
Neither lawbreaker should benefit, by way of having the officer call off
the chase, from his willingness to endanger those around him.
Third, it is possible in Situation C that no one will be injured by the
suspect's shooting, and the officer will be able to chase him until the
suspect tires and is tackled, or another officer rounds the corner and the
suspect realizes he is cornered, or maybe the suspect will just decide to
stop. Likewise, it is possible that a suspect in a vehicle may not hurt
anyone, or that he will pull over when enough officers are involved, or
that he will stop at a roadblock. But should society, through the courts
and police officers, allow this risk to be thrust upon the public? The
answer to this question is an emphatic no. Just as an officer would be
justified in, and even congratulated for, using deadly force to stop the
fleeing suspect in a mall who randomly fires gunshots, officers involved
in a car chase that endangers others should terminate the threat which
the chase presents, and courts should clearly support officers who take
this action. If state tort law would protect an officer from liability in
Situation C, it should logically provide the same protection to an officer
who accidentally injures someone while shooting in the course of a
pursuit.
IX.

ALTERNATIVE MEANS TO STOP PURSUITS

Several devices have been invented to decrease a suspect's ability to
run from the police, but these are not adequate to the task. One device,
the stopstick, is now in use by several agencies across the country. It is
a stick containing hollowed out pins which are pulled from the stick into
tires that pass over them.292 The tire then deflates at a constant rate.
Yet stopsticks do not provide a sure means of stopping a pursuit. First,
an officer ahead of the chase must know when and where to deploy
them.29 3 Second, the suspect can just drive around the stick. This

292. Shoot Not To Kill: Non-Lethal Weapons (Discovery Channel television broadcast,
originally aired Dec. 29, 1997).
293. This essentially involves guessing the routes the suspect will take.
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shortcoming was amply demonstrated on a recent documentary-type
The first video showed a suspect driving along a
police show.2"
freeway in a stolen vehicle, talking on a cell phone while being pursued
by several police cars. Two officers ahead of the chase deployed
stopsticks in the roadway, and the suspect swerved around them as he
wove in and out of the congested traffic. The two officers could have
fired into the suspect's windshield as he drove by, but they did not. In
another chase later in the broadcast, the suspect's vehicle dodged the
first set of sticks, ran over the second, and just kept driving on the
Clearly, stopsticks do not provide the solution to
deflated tires.2"'
stopping fleeing vehicles.
Another device capable of deployment is set in the roadway and injects
a pulse of energy into vehicles that pass over it. 2 However, it has the
same shortcomings as the stopstick in that it must be deployed in the
suspect's path and the suspect must drive over it. A different electronic
device can be carried on a rocket-powered model car, which is then fired
from the pursuing vehicle's bumper.297 Due to their expense and
experimental nature, neither of these devices is in use by any department.2 98
A possible solution to police chases overall might have been found by
an engineer in California by the name of Charles H. Gabbard. 2 This
gentleman has designed a microchip that, when activated by a laser,
cuts off the fuel supply to the car. It is estimated that each vehicle
manufacturer could install these chips on all future models for approximately $20 per car. The laser can be fired by an officer either on the
ground or in a helicopter. Its use is currently being studied by the
California Highway Patrol, and legislators in that state are being
pressed to pass a law requiring the new technology. If this technology
police chases as we know them may soon become a
works as designed,
300
thing of the past.

294.

World's Wildest Police Videos: Robbers On The Run (Fox television broadcast, Oct.

20, 2000).
295. Id.
296. See supra note 292.
297. Id.
298. See supra note 280.
299. Kristina Wells, Device May Zap Police Chases: New Laser Technology Would
Enable Authorities to Halt PotentiallyDangerousPursuitsQuickly and Safely, THE PRESSENTERPRISE, Sept. 23, 2000, at B1.
300. Id.
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CONCLUSION

A high-speed pursuit presents danger to both the officers involved and
the community as a whole.30 ' The risks of death and serious bodily
harm presented by these chases should be upon those fleeing suspects
who create the need to chase in the first place.3 °2 As with other
threats to life, the police are justified in using deadly force to end the
threat posed by high-speed pursuits. From the suspect's perspective, the
danger posed by law enforcement's potential use of deadly force is easily
mitigated. All the suspect needs to do is submit to the lawful assertion
of authority and pull over. '
Will mistakes and tragedies still occur? Of course they will, for
"[dleath and disability haunt law enforcement."0 4 However, it should
be understood that this Comment does not advocate the indiscriminate
use of gunfire nor a return to the days of the Wild West. But the reality
is that there are occasions when shots can safely be fired to stop a
Those opportunities may be present when the
fleeing vehicle. '
suspect turns, at roadblocks, from officers beside the target vehicle, and
in agencies that use two-man patrol cars.30 6 Ramming the suspect
vehicle may also be used in some circumstances, but this technique
involves a higher degree of risk to the officers in pursuit, as well as a
higher degree of skill to accomplish safely.30 7

301. See, e.g., Scott, 205 F.3d at 876; Cole, 933 F.2d at 1333.
302. The author recognizes there are those who contend that, rather than the suspect,
it is the police who create the danger to the public by engaging in pursuits. See Jensen,
supra note 3, at 1278. While the utter illogic of this theory merits a separate article
devoted to nothing else, suffice it to say that this "effort to shift the blame-the proposition
that it is law enforcement that causes crime-is not one that any legal system can accept."
Mays, 123 F.3d at 1004.
303. See Garner,471 U.S. at 29 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("[To avoid the use of deadly
force and the consequent risk to his life, the suspect need merely obey the valid order to
halt.").
304. Mays, 123 F.3d at 1003.
305. Telephone Interview with Lieutenant Dennis Turner, Pickens County Sheriff's
Office, S.C., Guest Driving Instructor, 1979-present, S.C. Criminal Justice Academy (Feb.
26, 2001).
306. Id. First, an officer in the passenger seat of a pursuing patrol car can lean out of
the window and fire with either his sidearm or a long gun. Second, as the suspect vehicle
makes a turn, a single pursuing officer may be able to get a safe shot from either side
window by steering wider than the suspect. Third, officers beside a target vehicle will have
clear, unobstructed shots at the target's tires, engine block, and driver. Finally, roadblocks
provide the best opportunity to fire safely at and hit the target vehicle because the officer
is stationary.
307. See supra note 305.
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Finally, the potential deterrent effect of deadly force provides a
separate reason for its application. Once it becomes clear to the
community that violators who run will be stopped, one way or another,
the number of traffic violators who flee should decrease. Flight can then
be used to indicate a truly serious offender, rather than someone who
merely fears an insurance cost increase that may result from receiving
a speeding ticket.
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